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This article analyses five types of international trade based on
the competitive advantages afforded to under-developed coun-
tries by their environmental resources endowment. First of all,
specialization of such countries in the production of highly pol-
luting goods and services is studied, recalling the conventional
specialization in the production and export of goods making in-
tensive use of natural resources. The commercial exploitation
of the recreational services of natural parks and the exploitation
of biodiversity in pharmaceutical research is then referred to.
The use for profit of some environmental services involving
these resources which are in the nature of public goods and
which would require some type of bilateral or multilateral in-
ternational agreement is addressed. The access of these coun-
tries on an equal footing to a number of global and common
resources is then considered, and finally some conclusions are
presented. According to these conclusions, it is hard for trade
relations between developing and developed countries, based
on specialization in the use of the endowment of environmental
and natural resources, to provide any solution to the problems
of poverty and environmental degradation. However, more effi-
cient, more imaginative and, in the final analysis, more equita-
ble exploitation of these resources could make a much bigger
contribution to the solution of these two serious problems. In
this case, in order to attain economic and social efficiency it is
necessary to receive the collaboration of the advanced coun-
tries, in view of the fact that environmental resources are in the
nature of public goods.
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Two of the most serious problems facing mankind at
the close of the twentieth century are more and more
closely intertwined in an increasingly integrated
economy: the problem of poverty, and that of envi-
ronmental deterioration. Although the relation be-
tween the two has been abundantly documented
(Goodstein, 1995, chap. 19), it would unfortunately
appear that the growth processes of the underdevel-
oped economies, in so far as they take place, do not
guarantee their solution. Indeed, the empirical data
show that the environmental indicators display a
U-shaped form of evolution: the problems tend to get
worse with the growth process until they reach a
turning point, at their lowest level, after which the
quality of the environment begins to improve. This
turning point takes place at different levels of
per capita income, depending on the indicator under
analysis: in general, it takes place when the countries
reach a per capita income level similar to that of
Mexico (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). However,
this improvement is limited to local environmental
problems: in the case of global-level problems, the
growth process does not appear to be accompanied
by such possible improvements (Shafik, 1994). This
is probably due, on the one hand, to factors con-
nected with the patterns of consumption that accom-
pany the growth process itself and, on the other, to
the fact that this growth takes place in the context of
an increasingly integrated economy in which interna-
tional trade flows may be facilitating this transfer of
pollution from the more highly developed economies
to the poorer ones. This is shown, at least from a the-
oretical point of view, by studies which have incor-
porated environmental variables in international
trade models (Copeland and Taylor, 1995a).
This article aims to show that the present trade
relations between underdeveloped and developed
countries, which are the result of specialization based
on the countries’ environmental and natural resource
endowments, are hardly likely to provide a solution
to the problems of poverty and environmental degra-
dation. In contrast, a more efficient, more imagina-
tive and, in the final analysis, more even-handed
form of exploitation of those resources could do a
great deal more to solve them. In this case, in order
to achieve greater economic and social efficiency the
collaboration of the advanced countries would be re-
quired, because these resources are in the nature of
public goods, but this would ultimately redound to
the benefit of all concerned.
We will therefore analyse five different types of
international trade based on the comparative advan-
tages given to the underdeveloped countries by their
environmental resource endowments. In section II
we will deal with the most obvious and questionable
of these: specialization by these countries in the pro-
duction of highly polluting goods and services, that
is to say, ecological dumping. In section III we will
review the conventional specialization in the produc-
tion and export of goods that make intensive use of
natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable.
In both cases, the conclusions reached are not very
optimistic with regard to the ability of this type of
trade to solve the problems of poverty and environ-
mental degradation, viewed from a global standpoint.
In section IV we will bring in a possibility which is
assuming growing importance, especially for certain
countries: exploitation of the financial gains that can
be obtained from certain services related with natural
resources and the environment, above all the recre-
ational services of nature parks and the exploitation
of biodiversity in pharmaceutical research. In section
V, going beyond the limits of private goods1 –limits
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 Preliminary versions of this study were presented at the De-
partment of Economics of the Universidad de la República
(Montevideo, Uruguay), the University of Corrientes (Argen-
tina), the Second International Economics Symposium held at
the Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey (Mexico), and the Insti-
tute for the Ecodevelopment of the Amazonian Region of Ecua-
dor (Quito), benefiting greatly from the ensuing discussions.
The authors wish to express their gratitude for the comments
made by J. M Naredo (Fundación Argentaria, Madrid), P.
Biffani (Geneva) and two anonymous referees. This study also
received research assistance from the Subdirección General de
Formación y Promoción del Conocimiento of the Ministry of
Education and Culture of Spain.
1 For which it is possible to make a charge, since in principle it
is possible to exclude those who do not pay from the possibility
of enjoying them.
which are already very blurred in the second of the
cases dealt with in the previous section– we will
address a much more promising matter: the possi-
bility of deriving profit from some environmental
services related to resources which are in the na-
ture of public goods but which, in order to allow
them to generate financial flows, require some kind
of bilateral or multilateral international agreements.
In section VI, within the same context of public
goods and the need for international agreements, we
will deal with what is probably the most promising
of the environmental assets possessed by the
less-privileged countries: their access on an equal
footing to a variety of global common resources.
Finally, in section VII we will draw some conclu-
sions from all the foregoing.
II
Ecological dumping
Ecological dumping occurs when a particular coun-
try allows its industries to sell their products at a
price which does not include all the marginal costs
involved (in this case, by leaving out certain environ-
mental costs), thanks to its more permissive legisla-
tion in this respect. Unlike conventional dumping,
this form of dumping requires government interven-
tion, but the result is the same: the enterprise in ques-
tion offers its products at less than cost by, in this
case, avoiding a Pigou tax that would have made the
private cost equal to the marginal social cost
(Rauscher, 1994). In the international sphere, the
possibility that the more backward regions might
specialize in the production of highly polluting
goods should come as no surprise: the theoretical
models which simulate the international trade behav-
iour of two representative countries (“North” and
“South”) culminate in this type of specialization
(Copeland and Taylor, 1995b). Although the ratio-
nality of this type of trade policy cannot always be
taken for granted in different circumstances
–Rauscher (1994) shows that the relaxation of envi-
ronmental regulations is not always the most suitable
policy for promoting exports– there can be no doubt
that this is a possibility entertained by a number of
countries and is the subject of heated controversy.2
The variable that explains this pattern of special-
ization is none other than the difference in levels of
per capita income and, hence, in the respective levels
of pollution-related supply and demand. However, it
is worth going into greater detail on this point, which
is sometimes euphemistically presented as merely
the result of a difference in the tastes of the respec-
tive societies.
Basically, the origin of pollution does indeed lie
in the process of production, distribution and con-
sumption of goods and services. As society does not
appear to be willing to dispense entirely with the
fruits of progress in order to secure an unblemished
environment, the problem of determining the “opti-
mum” degree of pollution arises: that is to say, the
point at which the benefits of production (the goods
and services it provides) are exactly equal to its
costs, including those related to environmental dete-
rioration. This is illustrated in figure 1, where the
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2 Thus, while some underdeveloped countries consider the con-
cern of the developed countries for the environment in this con-
text as a move to protect their own inefficient production
structures and do not hesitate to refer openly to the existence of
a new phenomenon, “eco-colonialism” (Rotillon and Tazdaït,
1996), the same term is used to denounce the exploitation of the
natural resources of underdeveloped countries by the great
transnational corporations (Ross, 1996).
FIGURE 1
The optimum level of pollution
Source: Prepared by the authors.
vertical axis measures, in pesos, the costs of produc-
ing, say, electric power, and the benefits provided by
its consumption, while the horizontal axis measures
the total amount of electric power produced. Let us
assume that the producer companies have a growing
cost structure, so that the curve of their marginal
costs (the cost of producing the last kW: CMge) has
the form shown in the figure. The marginal benefits
derived by society from the consumption of electric
power (the benefits provided by the last kW con-
sumed: BMg), however, are on a decreasing scale, as
shown in the figures, so that the needs covered by
them are less and less pressing. If this were all that
were involved, society should be at point A, since
dispensing with the production of one kW (a point
slightly to the left of kW0) would mean that the cost
saved would be less than the benefit forgone, while
the opposite would be the case if one additional kW
were produced.
However, this is not the end of the story: the cost
curve analysed so far does not reflect all the costs in-
curred by society in the production (and distribution)
of electric power, but only those that affect the elec-
tricity company: it does not include the environmen-
tal costs, for example. In conceptual terms, there is
no difficulty in introducing them into the calculation.
Their effect is all too well known: they are added to
the existing costs and shift the marginal cost curve
upward (CMgs). The change caused by this is easy to
interpret: the new optimum point is B, marked by lower
production and consumption of electricity (kW1 < kW0),
and hence less pollution, and a higher price to the
end-user (P1 > P0). Obviously, the magnitude of the
impact will depend on the distance between the old
and new marginal cost curves (which are not neces-
sarily parallel: indeed, they will probably diverge to
an increasing extent, since pollution has growing
costs). In other words, the divergence will depend on
the value of the environmental costs imposed on so-
ciety by pollution. It is not easy to measure this loss
of well-being, even though there are a number of
more or less suitable methods for doing so (Azqueta,
1994). The European Union, for example, has com-
pleted the first stage of an ambitious research project
(Project ExternE) whose object is precisely to ex-
press in monetary terms the costs generated by envi-
ronmental pollution in the various cycles of electric
power production (European Community, 1995).3
Independently of the difficulties of calculation,
however, one thing is clear from these studies: the
value of the loss of well-being caused by pollution is
seen to be greater in proportion to the level of in-
come of the population affected. This is particularly
evident, for example, when it is a question of the im-
pact of pollution on the life and health of the popula-
tion and there is an increase in the rates of morbidity
and mortality of the community affected: generally
speaking, the lower the income of the persons in
question, the lower the value of a “statistical life”.
This is precisely the argument used to justify ecolog-
ical dumping: as more backward countries or regions
have a lower level of income, the cost of the loss of
environmental quality in them is also lower (the mar-
ginal cost curve shifts upward by a smaller amount),
and hence the production of highly contaminating
goods in them will be cheaper. Ultimately, the idea is
that deterioration of the environment will cause less
loss of well-being in poor countries or regions than
in rich ones, thus giving them a comparative advan-
tage. If this were so, the production and export of
highly polluting goods and services would be justi-
fied, in principle, provided that the pollution were
strictly local (otherwise it would generate negative
externalities against those who do not themselves
benefit from the process), limited in time, and
non-cumulative, since otherwise it would be operat-
ing against future generations.4
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3 This process of placing values on environmental assets (or the
loss of them) means reducing them to the category of goods.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with goods: it is just that
many people feel that the relationship that a person establishes
with them (reflected in the fact that he would be willing to ex-
change them for an amount of money which would keep his
level of well-being unchanged) is not what they would consider
appropriate for representing mankind’s relationship with nature
(Anderson, 1993, chap. 9). In other words, the conventional
form of valuation is based on the idea of the values used in trade
and fails to take account, among other things, of the priceless
values that could be modelled through a lexicographic but not a
monetary order (Lockwood, 1997). We will return to this point
at the end of this study.
4 The argument that future generations could be compensated
through the investment on their behalf of an appropriate part of
the benefits generated in the process, replacing natural capital
with produced capital, is not really valid; such replacement is
not always possible, and moreover no-one has asked them –or
could ask them– if they are in agreement with this approach.
Indeed, there would be no point in doing so, since they are the
ones who are going to be replaced: if there is pollution, the
group of persons who will form part of the future generation
will be different from that which would have made up that gen-
eration if pollution had not taken place. This is a “problem of
indetermination” (Elliot, 1995, p. 3), which conventional eco-
nomic analysis circumvents through the fact that, in its underly-
ing utilitarian philosophy, what matters is the total amount of
pleasure and pain, not the particular individuals who experience
those feelings.
Obviously, however, this argument raises too
many problems to be accepted without reservations:
i) The fact that pollution would appear to be
“less costly” among the under-privileged strata of the
population is explained by the fact that what most of
the methods used to determine the value of the harm
caused do is merely to try to find out if people are
willing to pay to avoid it. However, it is very well
known that the amount that one is willing to pay for
something depends, among other things, on what one
is able to pay (the demand for a good depends on
people’s income), and as those who have nothing
cannot pay anything, environmental degradation ap-
pears to be less costly. The problem is therefore anal-
ogous to that of child labour in the underdeveloped
countries: without seeking to defend attitudes which
involve a good deal of hypocrisy, there can be no
doubt that basing a growth process on elements like
this can only be considered as evidence of our utter
failure as a society. Sacrificing both the physical and
mental health of the less-privileged strata of the pop-
ulation cannot be the solution to the poverty problem.
The “comparative advantage” of the underdeveloped
regions in terms of acceptance of pollution is thus
based on an ethically indefensible assumption. The
same could be said, of course, of those cases where
this type of specialization is explained not so much
by the difference in the respective social “demands”
regarding levels of pollution (we are assuming here
that, in contrast with the previously mentioned case,
these demands are identical), but instead by the fact
that in underdeveloped countries the government
does not reflect these preferences in its actions,
whereas in the developed countries it does
(Chichilnisky, 1994): this too represents an ethically
unacceptable starting point, although at least with re-
gard to the first part of the argument it is probably
quite realistic.
ii) The approach taken in order to justify this ap-
parently lower cost of environmental degradation in
backward countries suffers from the error of not tak-
ing into account a whole series of external effects of
such degradation which are not picked up in the val-
uation methods but nevertheless help to determine
the cost of the damage done: people may be obliged
to accept substandard environmental conditions be-
cause they need a job, but this will affect not only
their own health (and that of their neighbours), with
consequent costs in terms of public health and/or the
corresponding loss of human capital, but also the du-
rability of urban infrastructure, the cost of maintain-
ing and cleaning movable and immovable assets, the
productivity of nearby agricultural and forestry oper-
ations, etc. (Azqueta, 1994, chap. 10). It is highly un-
likely that the affected person will take account of all
these indirect effects of pollution when evaluating
the costs it entails for him: it would be necessary to ap-
ply a series of well-calibrated indirect valuation meth-
ods which take all of these externalities into account.
Thus, when the cost of such specialization for the
country as a whole –and not just for those directly
affected– is analysed, these apparent “comparative ad-
vantages” could turn out to be substantially reduced.
iii) Finally, acting in this way means reducing
the health of human beings to the level of a mere
good: a good consumed on an individual and exclu-
sive basis, as a function of purchasing power, and ex-
changeable for a given sum of money –a good whose
production and consumption are, in the final analy-
sis, left in the hands of the market (Anderson, 1993).
It is unlikely, from an ethical standpoint, that the
social consideration of health as a mere item of mer-
chandise would be acceptable; most likely society
would prefer, at least ideally, a different kind of solu-
tion.
To sum up, then, ecological dumping is no more
justifiable than child labour. It is not an ethically ac-
ceptable solution for the problem of poverty, and it
goes without saying that it does not seem likely to
solve environmental problems.
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III
The exploitation of natural resources
In this section we group together everything that is
usually considered as renewable or non-renewable
natural resources in the literature: all attributes of the
earth, whether living or inanimate, that mankind ex-
ploits as a source of food, raw materials or energy.5
Depressed areas which are fortunate enough to
possess some kind of natural resource can achieve
comparative (and even absolute) advantages in the
production of goods and services that make intensive
use of that resource. This is something which is so
obvious that it is not worth dwelling further on it, ex-
cept perhaps to recall some equally obvious aspects
regarding the limits imposed by considerations of
efficiency and equity on the exploitation of these
resources. To this end, we will divide the analysis
into two main parts:
1. Renewable resources
Renewable resources pose a problem which is simple
only in appearance. Two of the most typical cases
are probably fisheries and forests, and we will there-
fore refer to these two examples. Their analysis will,
in addition, provide an opportunity to perceive some
of the problems involved in institutional arrange-
ments regulating their exploitation.
Under the market system, the management of a
fishery will seek to maximize the present value of
the net monetary flows generated by its commercial
exploitation, from a purely financial perspective;
that is to say, by marketing the biomass caught,
which is what a market values. Let us assume that
the growth rate of this biomass (x = dx/dt) is a posi-
tive function of its intrinsic growth rate [H(x)] and
the rate of extraction (y), which is itself a function of
the cost of fishing (C) and the expected price for the
fish caught (P):
x = H(x) – y (1)
Figure 2 shows this situation.
On the basis of this behaviour equation, if there
is free access to the resource, the economic agents
(the fishery companies) will try to solve a problem of
conditioned maximization in which the control vari-
able is the fishing effort (y), whose optimum value is
given as a function of the cost of extracting the bio-
mass (C) and the expected price for the latter (P).
When this ratio is not very high [(P/C)0], the resource
could be managed in a sustainable manner, since the
optimum level of extraction is potentially compatible
with positive growth rates of the stock of fish. When
this not so, however [(P/C)1], the attempt to secure
maximum financial benefits will prevent this equilib-
rium from being attained and the resource will tend
to be depleted, since the high rates of extraction will
prevent its natural regeneration.
Let us now look at the case of a forest managed
under some form of private or common ownership
which, as it prevents free access to it, permits the
planning of its rate of exploitation as a renewable
source of timber with an eye to the future. The prob-
lem of conditioned maximization clearly arises here
in an inter-temporal context in which the objective
variable is the net present value of the yields that the
exploitation of the resource will generate in the
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5 Although Reed (1994) cites this definition, he is not com-
pletely in agreement with it, as it does not include “gifts” such
as clean air and unspoilt nature. It is a very suitable definition
for our purpose here, however, as these “gifts” will in fact be
analysed in subsequent sections.
FIGURE 2
Optimum exploitation of a freely accessible renewable
resource
Source: Swanson, 1994.
course of its useful life. Maintaining the previous be-
haviour equations and adapting the nomenclature to
the present case, the problem posed is:
max
0
t∫ [P(y)y – C(x)y]e-rtdt (2)
subject to:
x = H(x) – y
where P is the expected price of the timber, C its cost
of extraction and r the yield on capital in the finan-
cial system.
The appearance of an opportunity cost for the
capital invested (r), which acts as a discount rate for
updating the value of the flows over time, may have
the undesirable consequence that sustainable man-
agement of the resource may be unprofitable if its
natural growth is relatively slow, as shown in figure 3
(Swanson, 1994). Indeed, in this second case the in-
ternal rate of yield offered by sustainable exploita-
tion of the asset is systematically below the
opportunity cost of the capital involved. Unlike the
previous case, it is not free access that prevents
maintenance of the resource, but the fact that the
yield on the natural capital (measured by the biologi-
cal growth rate of the wood, and assuming that the
price of the latter is constant) cannot compete with
the alternatives offered by the financial system.6
In many cases the macroeconomic circum-
stances of the underdeveloped countries themselves
aggravate these problems. Thus, the shortage of for-
eign exchange due to the structural imbalance in the
balance of payments (reflected in a very high im-
plicit cost of foreign exchange) leads the public sec-
tor to adopt a number of measures which encourage
the commercial exploitation of natural resources for
export, because in the short term this helps to solve
the problem, even though it is not the most profitable
option from the economic point of view (because of
the negative externalities it generates and its oppor-
tunity cost), while in the medium term it is harmful
to the environment and ecologically unsustainable
(Azqueta, 1992).7 It is therefore worth making a brief
analysis of the controversy which has arisen over the
adoption by a number of underdeveloped countries
of measures restricting trade in certain natural prod-
ucts (Lee, 1996).
The fact that some developing countries have
prohibited the export of wood in the rough, for exam-
ple, has been questioned by the importing countries
on the grounds that the use of such wood leads to
greater environmental efficiency (Anderson, 1996).
The developed countries, with their better technology
and more highly skilled labour, are indeed more effi-
cient in the use of wood as a raw material in the pro-
duction process, so that the export of wood in the
rough makes it possible to reduce the amount of
wood used per unit of final product. Furthermore, the
likely reduction in the local price of wood due to the
export prohibition may increase its consumption and
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6 The results that can be reached in the two cases analysed show
the importance of the institutional aspects affecting exploita-
tion; insecure land tenure, for example, reduces the value of the
upper limit of the integral (t) in equation (2), by reducing the
relevant time horizon for the decision-maker and making invest-
ments which bear fruit in the medium and long term (for-
estry) less profitable than those which produce greater yields in
the short term (conversion of land for crop-growing or
stock-raising), even though overall the latter option gives lower
yields (Gottfried, Brockett and Davis, 1994).
FIGURE 3
Optimum rate of exploitation over
time of a privately owned
renewable resource
Source: Wanson, 1994.
7 In the case of Costa Rica, for example, the increase in the de-
mand for beef in the developed countries led to an increase of
3.5% per year in the area devoted to pastures between 1965 and
1990, often with support from foreign finance and development
assistance programmes. This resulted in a progressive loss of
tropical forest, whose area went down by 2.8% per year over the
same period, with consequent deforestation, and the loss of 50%
of the area devoted to (ecologically sustainable) traditional agri-
culture, with a corresponding fall in employment and produc-
tion and an increase in the nutritional deficiencies of the local
population (Pearce and Warford, 1993).
make it less efficient, unless it is offset by a suitable
policy of licences for cutting down trees. However,
this latter view is based on very short-term argu-
ments (almost an analysis of comparative static effi-
ciency) and does not take account of the dynamic
effects on development of a policy which makes it
possible to retain within the country the operations
that generate most added value (Goodland and Daly,
1996).8 In the medium and long term, the environ-
mental benefits of the process of generation of in-
come and employment that such a prohibition
implies are probably greater than the effects of the
loss of efficiency in the short term. An export prohi-
bition of this type must be accompanied, however,
by some type of economic alternative. Outright pro-
hibition of marketing wood, far from preserving this
resource, generally militates against this when the
occupation of territory has already taken place or is
under way: the profitability of forestry operations
goes down compared with agriculture or stock-raising in
the same areas, due to the reduction of the value P in
equation (2), thus encouraging the clearing of forests
to permit cultivation of crops or stock-raising. Con-
sequently, before adopting this kind of measures it is
necessary to make a careful institutional analysis of
the situation. In this respect, certificates of origin of
wood which guarantee the sustainability of the for-
estry operations from which the wood comes9 could
be a better alternative than outright prohibition. At
all events, this possibility should be viewed in its
true perspective: as noted by Gottfried, Brockett and
Davis (1994), sustainable forest management (which
at least saves the secondary forest, if not the primary
one) requires a large area of land per family in order
to ensure an acceptable income, and this sheds seri-
ous doubt on the possibility of giving the whole pop-
ulation of the area a satisfactory standard of living by
this means.
In any case, it should be borne in mind that the
commercial exploitation of various natural resources
on the basis of their market value, even if sustainable,
does not take account of the environmental externalities
generated by the resource in question, and these exter-
nalities, which may have a much higher economic value,
are usually incompatible with this type of exploitation.
Taking account only of the values provided by the mar-
ket is therefore no guarantee whatever that the exploita-
tion of the resource will be socially optimal.
2. Non-renewable resources
Non-renewable resources, by definition, cannot be
exploited in a sustainable manner. The objective pur-
sued in this case is to share them properly among all
concerned: a problem of inter-generational equity.
The usual procedure for this purpose is to use what is
called “Hotelling’s rule”, which relates the rate of
exploitation of the resource with its price and interest
rates (Gómez, 1994). This may not be a very useful
rule for solving the problem in practice, but it is use-
ful for expressing it more clearly, since it brings out
the fact that non-renewable resources have an oppor-
tunity cost which must be added to the cost of their
extraction when deciding the rate at which they are
to be exploited. This opportunity cost must be calcu-
lated and taken into account in order to accurately
determine the net benefits from their exploitation, al-
though the conventional national accounts do not do
so and therefore provide false figures on the profit-
ability of such exploitation and the resulting growth
rates of national income. In this respect, it is worth
mentioning the practice which is becoming accepted
in the World Bank, which consists of calculating the
cost of the investments needed in order to replace, in
an alternative project or programme, the services that
the non-renewable resources exploited would have
provided (Von Amsberg, 1993).10
It is also necessary to take account of the environ-
mental impact of the exploitation processes themselves.
The study by the European Community (1995) on the
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8 Indonesia, which was one of the largest exporters of wood in
the rough during the 1970s (it exported as much as 40% of the
world total), introduced such a prohibition in 1985, invoking
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). By the mid-1980s, such exports had practically disap-
peared, whereas exports of wood products amounted to US$ 3.8
billion in 1991 (Goodland and Daly, 1996). A more negative
view of the environmental effects of this substitution is given in
Anderson (1996).
9 Along the lines of the Forest Stewardship Council based in
Oaxaca (Mexico).
10 It is interesting to note that the prices of non-renewable re-
sources, which should display an upward trend over time, be-
cause of the increase in the rents expected from them on
account of their growing scarcity, do not seem to behave in this
manner. An interesting explanation which has been put forward
for this phenomenon is based on the relation which exists be-
tween some of these resources and the global pollution caused
by their use (in the case of fossil fuels, for example): the limits
placed on the emission of pollutants through their use may
cause them to be prohibited before their actual physical disap-
pearance, which would be reflected in this form of evolution of
their expected prices (Berck and Roberts, 1996).
environmental costs of electric power generation, re-
ferred to earlier in this article, is an excellent exam-
ple of the path to follow. For example, the extraction
of petroleum in certain tropical forest areas has an
environmental impact which is not limited to that of
the operations of the oil company proper, although
that impact is by no means insignificant, but goes far
beyond it because of the accompanying establishment
of human settlements in those areas, which proves to be
a much greater threat to the sustainability of the primary
forests. This phenomenon suggests that we should not
only calculate this impact, as one of the prices to be paid
for the extraction of crude oil, but also try to avoid it al-
together. In order to do this it would be necessary to take
action on the ultimate causes of this phenomenon by
seeking to improve living and working conditions in the
areas of origin of the potential emigrants in order to try
to check this flow of settlers. The lessons learned in the
sphere of development economics from Todaro’s migra-
tion functions and from analysis of the informal sector,
which indicate that the creation of jobs in the urban for-
mal sector probably makes unemployment problems
worse rather than solving them, could also be perfectly
applicable in this case: certain social and infrastructural
investments in the area of operations could actually
make the situation worse, by raising the expectations of
potential immigrants.11
Ultimately, what is involved is the solution of a
problem which could be summed up, in a highly sim-
plified form, as the need to calculate the social inter-
est rate to discount from the net flow of benefits from
the exploitation of non-renewable resources, which it
is sought to maximize. The problem is by no means
easy, of course: in the final analysis it is a question of
inter-generational equity in conditions of uncertainty
and irreversibility.12
IV
The exploitation of some
environmental services
Some environmental services of the biosphere have
the properties of public goods (non-exclusion and
non-rivality in their consumption), possibly modified
by the presence of congestion. Administrative mea-
sures, however, can impose exclusiveness in their
enjoyment and thus allow the appearance of a price
for them. This is so in the case of the recreational
services of a particular environment (a nature park,
for example) for which an admission charge is made;
the research possibilities opened up by the
biodiversity that exists in a particular nature reserve;
or the renting-out of a specific area as a dumping
ground for wastes (even including toxic and hazard-
ous wastes) that the developed world does not want.
In view of the similarities that exist between this lat-
ter case and the factors we mentioned when dealing
with ecological dumping, which would also be appli-
cable here, the following analysis will be limited to
the first two cases mentioned above.13
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11 In the case of Ecuadorian Amazonia, the funds that ECORAE
receives from the oil companies, which are to be invested in or-
der to secure the sustainable development of the area, would
probably achieve this objective more effectively if they were in-
vested in the Loja area (many hundreds of kilometres away)
rather than in Amazonia itself. By doing so, an attempt could be
made to stop the already very substantial flow of migrants (in-
deed, one of the main towns of the area where the oil companies
are operating, Lago Agrio, is already known as Nueva Loja),
which the improvement of living and working conditions in
Amazonia would merely serve to foment still further.
12 See, for example, Sterner (1994) and Weitzman (1994).
13 Defending the export of waste to underdeveloped countries
with arguments like those mentioned in the section on ecologi-
cal dumping can have highly negative consequences: Krugman
and Obstfeld (1995, p. 91) describe how the collision between
apparent economic common sense and morality became un-
pleasantly obvious in 1992 for Lawrence Summers, chief econ-
omist of the World Bank. A World Bank internal memorandum
signed by Summers supported the idea that it could be reason-
able, in economic terms, for the developing countries to apply
rather more permissive environmental standards than the rich
countries, since this could give them a de facto comparative ad-
vantage in some polluting industries. The text of the memoran-
dum was filtered to the press, giving rise to a flood of bad
publicity (People magazine included Summers on its list of the
worst enemies of the environment), and in December of that
year it appeared that the controversy over that memorandum
was responsible for blocking the expected appointment of Sum-
mers as chief economic adviser to President Bill Clinton.
1. Exploitation of nature parks for recreational
purposes
Nature parks are becoming more and more impor-
tant as the centre of attraction for a particular type
of tourism which seeks precisely the sort of expe-
riences offered by nature in the wild. The pres-
ence of such nature-lovers in the environment
they want to visit has a by no means negligible
multiplier effect on the economy of the area
(transport services, accommodation, etc.). In
Costa Rica, for example, in 1991 the nature parks
attracted half a million visitors who generated
over US$ 330 million of foreign exchange, thus
becoming the country’s second largest industry
(Grey, 1995, p. 5). Unlike other natural assets
sought by tourists for leisure purposes, these
parks are valued for their unspoilt character, and
demand studies tend to show that visitors are very
sensitive to everything –such as overcrowding or
excessive commercialization– that affects their
enjoyment of nature (Dixon, Scura and Van’t
Hof, 1995; Shah, 1995).
Economic analysis reveals that these assets have
at least three sources of direct value:
i) A financial value for the owners of neigh-
bouring properties, which can serve as a base for
tourism operations and therefore gain in value.
Other owners, however, may be adversely affected
if the protection of the environment means that
they cannot continue to carry out a number of eco-
nomically profitable activities (farming, hunting,
stock-raising, etc.).
ii) An economic value for society as a whole,
due to the multiplier effect that these operations have
on income and employment in the area (assuming
that this is not a zero-sum game) or in the country as
a whole. Ultimately, the public budget is also fa-
voured through the higher income generated by the
increase in economic activity, though in this case the
impact is purely redistributive.
iii) The recreational value proper arising from
the well-being experienced by visitors, which is
reflected in the value of the net consumer surplus, as
determined by, for example, the journey cost or
contingent valuation methods (Azqueta and Pérez,
1996).
The problem facing the managers of these ar-
eas, when seeking to maximize their social value,
is therefore to find the difficult balance between
public and private financial profitability (in the
medium and long term), the multiplier effect on
employment and income in the economy, and the
preservation of the essential ecological functions
of the environment (maintaining biodiversity, for
example). All this must also be achieved without
losing sight of the interests of the local popula-
tion, who are usually adversely affected by the
protection of the area (since restrictions are im-
posed on activities in it and access to resources
traditionally used in the past) yet do not benefit
from the multiplier effect, since normally these
effects are felt mostly in the urban centres where
tourists stay. In this respect, if the presence of a
substantial consumer surplus among the visitors
is confirmed, attempts could be made to turn this
value (a positive disposition to pay for enjoyment
of the recreational services of the environment)
into a flow of financial resources (through entry
charges, for example) that could be directed in fa-
vour of those sections of the local population who
have been adversely affected.
Unfortunately, certain well-meant conserva-
tion policies may prove to be clearly harmful both
to the interests of the inhabitants of the surround-
ing area and to the objective of conservation itself.
This may be so, for example, as a result of the in-
clusion of certain species in Appendix I of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES), which prohibits all trading of the
corresponding products. The results of such a mea-
sure must be very carefully analysed, for when a
species thus protected competes with others which
are not, the final result may be counterproductive,
since the measure reduces the financial value of
the endangered species compared with its competi-
tors, thus reducing its practical value for the local
population in an attempt to save it at the global
level. Thus, if two species (say, elephants and cat-
tle) compete for territory, the local population is
being encouraged to displace elephants, which
have no practical value, to make room for cattle,
which do have such value. We already saw that the
same thing can happen with the prohibition of ex-
ports of certain types of wood. If the non-protected
species is a natural predator of the protected spe-
cies, the fact that the prohibition eliminates the fi-
nancial value of the latter makes its protection less
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profitable, and this state of affairs becomes even
more unfavourable if the predator does have a fi-
nancial value (Swanson, 1993; Schulz, 1996).14
The foregoing can be expressed in formal terms
on the basis of figure 4 (similar to figure 2). The
growth function of the resource H(x) depends on a
series of variables which are not shown in figure 4
because of the implicit introduction of a caeteris pa-
ribus clause but which obviously influence the evolu-
tion of the resource not only in terms of the land
devoted to its development (with its corresponding
load capacity) but also in terms of the execution of a
number of collateral investments (Swanson, 1994).
These measures, like the expansion of the area de-
voted to the resource, shift the curve outward, per-
mitting higher growth rates of the resource. In
contrast, when the resource loses its economic use
value these variables move in the opposite direction,
causing the growth curve to contract and making
ecologically sustainable management more difficult.
2. Pharmaceutical research and biodiversity
The case of biodiversity and the pharmaceutical in-
dustry is more complex. Some underdeveloped coun-
tries possess an asset in this respect from which they
can try to earn money by offering to allow the phar-
maceutical industry to exploit it in return for pay-
ment. In this way, they could not only preserve the
environment but also finance the development pro-
cess. However, it is necessary to get a clear picture
of the possibilities in this field before beginning to
celebrate. Firstly, serious estimates of the payments
that the countries owning such biodiversity might be
offered for its use (bearing in mind that they are cal-
culated as a percentage of the profits that the phar-
maceutical company makes from the commercial
exploitation of the product finally obtained) give re-
ally modest sums which would hardly be sufficient
to cover the preservation of this asset (Simpson,
Sedjo and Reid, 1996). Secondly, it should be noted
that in order to carry out this operation it is necessary
first of all to invest in the conservation of the
biodiversity of a particular environment, and as it is a
public good this can only be done by the administra-
tion. The authorities of such countries generally pro-
vide a number of extra services (identification and
classification in local laboratories and research cen-
tres) for which they make no charge, and if we add to
this the opportunity cost of the land set aside for the
preservation of biodiversity we see that the “big
deal” may prove to be financially ruinous. Barbier
and Aylward (1996) calculated that the net present
value of the benefits that Costa Rica would receive
in this respect from the preservation of a particular
natural space for a period of 40 years would amount
to US$ 4.6 million, whereas the net present value of
the costs involved (including the opportunity cost of
the protected land) would come to US$ 240 million
over the same period.
It is therefore obviously very important to take
into account the institutional framework within
which these kinds of agreements are signed (al-
though the calculations of the above-mentioned au-
thors do not hold out much hope on this level) and
the need for coordination among the different coun-
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14 Barnes (1996) has made an interesting study on the possible
effects in Botswana of the inclusion of elephants on the pro-
tected list. Taking into account both the opportunity cost of the
land occupied by the elephants and the costs of protection
which have an impact on management costs (keeping watch,
control, etc.), he puts forward what he considers would be the
best strategy for managing this resource. Using the framework
of social project evaluation for this purpose, and introducing the
corresponding implicit prices, he comes to the conclusion that
the controlled reintroduction of a number of prohibited prac-
tices (hunting for sport, hunting by the local population, use of
elephant meat in crocodile farms for the marketing of skins,
etc.) would markedly improve the economic value (for the
country) and the financial value (for the local population) of el-
ephants and hence would ultimately make a greater contribution
to their preservation. The prohibition of trading elephant-based
products was needlessly reducing their economic use value
solely to that deriving from their mere observation.
FIGURE 4
Growth rate of a renewable resource
Source: Adapted from Swanson, 1994.
tries possessing biodiversity (which can to some ex-
tent take each other’s place in this respect), so that
they will not compete with each other and thus lose a
large part of the benefits of exploiting that
biodiversity commercially. It is also worth noting
that the institutional framework in which these trans-
actions take place does not recognize that the true
owners of these areas, the indigenous peoples, have
intellectual property rights for a large number of
medicines and treatments which they have developed
through their knowledge of nature and which have
brought the pharmaceutical industry enormous
profits (Azqueta-Bernar, 1996).
At all events, subject to the above reservation re-
garding the pharmaceutical industry, such efforts to
derive gain from some natural resource- and environ-
ment-linked services undoubtedly seem to have posi-
tive aspects. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning a
couple of obvious limitations of this sale of environ-
mental services with regard to the objectives of re-
ducing poverty and environmental degradation.
Firstly, while there can be no objection to the idea of
deriving gains from the recreational services of cer-
tain natural areas, this nevertheless leaves out all
those natural environments which are not considered
as “cathedrals of nature” yet are particularly threat-
ened; it is precisely for this reason that the different
forms of protection of natural areas have been evolv-
ing in this direction (López Ramón, 1996). Secondly,
with regard to the solution of the problem of devel-
opment, the difficulty is that on the whole these “ca-
thedrals” are not very equitably shared out, and
many countries and regions have very few of them.
Therefore, while this is probably a better scheme
than those analysed earlier, it can nevertheless not be
relied on alone to solve the environmental problem
of the global preservation of natural areas or the re-




A fourth possibility which is undoubtedly interesting
and is only beginning to be explored derives from
the fact that some natural resources generate a series
of positive externalities which can redound to the
benefit of all. One of the most obvious cases is the
role played by large forested areas in fixing the car-
bon in the atmosphere. The existence of these posi-
tive externalities immediately gives rise to strong
tensions between the common interest on the one
hand and the private interests of those who consider
that they have a right to dispose of the asset and ob-
ject to the idea of preventing its commercial exploi-
tation and introducing a system which will only
bring them benefits very indirectly.15 This is a
long-standing conflict: the countries which have
tropical forests complain that, adducing the general
interest, those who did not trouble to preserve their
own resources are now trying to prevent them from
exploiting them in a financially profitable manner,
and moreover the rich countries are not willing to of-
fer many alternative ways of solving the problem of
underdevelopment either (for example, by opening
up their markets). Let us now look at two undoubt-
edly significant possibilities in this respect.
1. Carbon deposits
From the strictly economic point of view, the forego-
ing is a typical problem of the generation of positive
externalities which do not directly benefit the owner
of the resource. One solution could be to try to inter-
nalize the benefits provided by these services; in this
way, the rest of the world would pay the managers of
tropical forests the value of the services rendered by
them in retaining a quantity of carbon which, if liber-
ated into the atmosphere, would aggravate the global
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15 This is precisely why economic analysis is generally against
the recognition of private rights over environmental and natural
assets which generate various kinds of positive externalities:
the smaller the group recognized as owning the resource, the
greater the disparity between the financial benefits of its exploi-
tation (which are shared out among a few) and the correspond-
ing environmental costs (which are shared by the whole
population).
warming problem. This would occur if, for example,
they burnt or cut down those spaces to devote them
to agriculture and/or stock raising, as indeed many
countries which are now developed did in their time.
It is not easy to compute the value of these bene-
fits, but one way which is quite often used is to cal-
culate the economic cost that would be involved in
reducing emissions, at their source, by an equivalent
amount of carbon through, say, the conversion of in-
dustry or the modification of public transport sys-
tems. This would enable us to calculate the implicit
price of the resource on the basis of this environmen-
tal function. Likewise, once the principle that it is
necessary to remunerate the environmental functions
carried out by certain natural resources is accepted, it
would also be logical to remunerate countries which
have deposits of fossil fuels (oil, coal) in a similar
manner for not extracting them and keeping them in-
stead as carbon deposits (Goodland and Daly, 1996).
2. Carbon sinks
The foregoing also points the way to a second possi-
bility which, if treated with the necessary care, could
also be interesting. Thus, some developed countries
(specifically Canada) are analysing the potential
profitability of afforesting or reafforesting land
purely for the purpose of absorbing carbon from the
atmosphere in order to avoid having to reduce emis-
sions at their source by an equivalent amount to
comply with the environmental commitments they
have entered into. In this connection, Van Kooten,
Binkley and Delcourt (1995) have estimated that the
cost to a country like the United States or Canada of
fixing one metric ton of carbon by this means would
be between US$ 6.64 and US$ 10.67: a figure which
does not compare unfavourably with the US$ 1.35 to
US$ 59.41 it would cost to do so by other means, to
say nothing of the benefits that the creation of a for-
est area would bring in other respects.16 As well as
this direct contribution to reducing the amount of
carbon in the atmosphere by sequestering it, woods
and trees (especially in urban areas) also make an in-
direct contribution to this aim by reducing the con-
sumption of energy for certain activities. Thus, in
countries like those mentioned above, a suitable dis-
tribution of trees around dwellings can reduce the de-
mand for air conditioning by as much as 50% and the
need for heating by 15% (Sedjo, Wisniewski, Sam-
ple and Kinsman, 1995). It would also be possible to
carry out such operations in developing countries
too, by remunerating the reafforestation of marginal
land that could even serve as a protective belt for
other spaces. The problem is that, because of the
economic profitability of this operation, it might
seem an attractive proposition to turn mature primary
woodlands into a carbon sink, replacing the existing
trees with new ones which, managed with this objec-
tive, would maximize the amount of carbon seques-
tered. An option of this type, however, would not
stand up very well to cost/benefit analysis, since do-
ing this would cause the loss not only of an existing
carbon deposit but also of all the services provided
by the rest of the ecological functions of primary for-
ests, whose economic value (according to the data
given in the excellent study by Constanza, D’Arge
and De Groot (1997)) is very considerable and gives
a price per hectare for tropical forests which is a
good deal higher than that given by the commercial
exploitation of the land as a source of wood,
pastureland or any other market option.
In general terms, and for purely illustrative pur-
poses, Fearnside (1997) calculated that the environ-
mental services of the Amazonian rain forest would
be worth US$ 7 billion per year for maintenance of
biodiversity, US$ 24 billion as a carbon deposit, and
US$ 7 billion more for their role in the water cycle.
The first two are undoubtedly externalities which
benefit the whole of mankind. In the opinion of the
author, the first of these should not be subject to re-
duction with the passage of time, whereas the value
of the second should be discounted in this way to re-
flect the differing value of fixing carbon according to
when such fixing takes place. The third (regulation of
the water cycle) is of a more local nature, as it covers the
role of the Amazonian rain forest as a generator of
rain in that general area, together with the impact of
that rain on the productivity of agricultural land. At
all events, as the author himself acknowledges, these
very rough calculations do not include many other
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16 On the basis of these figures, the authors make an analysis of
a possible optimum subsidy policy for both reafforestation and
the subsequent use of the wood produced in such a way as to
keep the carbon sequestered: 40% of the wood used for con-
struction still exists after 50 years, while in the case of the wood
used for paper manufacture the figure is only 3% (Sedjo,
Wisniewski, Sample and Kinsman, 1995). There would thus be
justification for a subsidy for the outright burial of wood, as a
way of ensuring minimum return of carbon into the atmosphere.
positive aspects of the Amazonian rain forest, but
they nevertheless provide a very good idea both of
the magnitudes involved and of the path to follow.17
As in the case of exploitation of the recreational ser-
vices of natural areas, however, one must not lose
sight of the fact that although the economic value of
the forest, calculated in this way, is probably much
higher than that of any other option, in financial
terms the change may adversely affect the population
which uses the resource and may now be deprived of
access to it. Shyamsundar and Kramer (1996), in an
interesting analysis in which they combined the pro-
duction function method with that based on contin-
gent valuation (using for this purpose –in one of the
rare examples to be found in the literature– the
“compensation demanded” format), calculated the
loss of welfare that the inhabitants of the area would
suffer through the protection of the Mantadia Na-
tional Park in Madagascar. The result obtained indi-
cates that the adverse effects would be far from
negligible: in this case, their value was almost equal
to the commercial value of the rice harvest.
3. Debt for nature swaps
The foregoing approach may also be taken to include
the debt for nature swaps which were in vogue some
years ago between various non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) and some developing countries. This
system is very simple and well-known: it merely
consists of buying public external debt on the sec-
ondary market at a heavy discount and changing it
with the issuing country for some kind of environ-
mental commitment: creation of new nature reserves,
expansion and/or improvement of existing ones,
etc.18 Leaving aside the always thorny questions of
sovereignty, the problem with these schemes, apart
from their somewhat voluntaristic and unorganized
nature, is that they can result in an increase in the
price of the debt on the secondary market (because
of the increased demand). Such an increase does not
benefit the issuing country but instead its creditors
(who witness the rise in value of an asset which they
feared was virtually worthless), nor does it facilitate
subsequent operations of the same kind (as experi-
ence seems to have proved). It would therefore be
preferable to place payment for such positive envi-
ronmental externalities on a formal basis both in in-
stitutional terms, by setting up some supranational
body or agency to be responsible for it (which would
reduce the problems of sovereignty) and on the
strictly economic level, by determining the flows of
payments according to some established criterion.
Returning to the dual issue with which we are
concerned, this internalization and consequent en-
dowment with financial value of some environmental
externalities would appear to be an ideal complement
to what we analysed in the previous section from the
point of view of nature conservation and protection,
all the more so in view of the magnitude of the envi-
ronmental services acknowledged to be rendered by
these resources to mankind as a whole. Unfortunately,
it does not seem that the same can be said of their
possible contribution to solving the global problem
of poverty: not all poor countries or regions –espe-
cially the most under-privileged and needy– have
been lucky enough to possess such resources and be
able to preserve them. Table 1 shows, for example,
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17 Since some of these environmental benefits are subject both
to uncertainty about the future and the irreversibility that would
be involved in allowing activities which are financially profit-
able but incompatible with their maintenance in the long term,
this considerably complicates the decision-making process in
this respect. Albers, Fisher and Hanemann (1996) studied the
case of the Khao Yai National Park in Thailand, modelling the
problem of a decision-maker faced with three mutually exclu-
sive alternatives: preservation of the environment, semi-sustain-
able development of it, and non-sustainable development.
Taking account of the possible sequences through a dynamic
model and seeking to maximize the net present value in the best
of them, the study shows that the conventional open loop strat-
egy of maximizing the target function is inferior to a closed
loop strategy of incorporating such uncertainty about the future,
which results in better preservation of the environment.
18 Among the most significant of such swaps are: the purchase
of US$ 650,000 (nominal) of Bolivia’s external debt by the
Frank Weeden Foundation in return for increased protection of
a natural area in Beni; the swap of a million dollars’ worth of
Ecuadorian external debt, which the Wild World Fund (WWF)
acquired on the secondary market (at 30% of its nominal value),
for investments in environmental education, to begin with, and
a further five and a half million dollars’ worth of such debt (at
12% of its market value) a few years later, in return for invest-
ments in conservation activities in Ecuadorian Amazonia and
the Galapagos Islands; the purchase by The Nature Conser-
vancy (another NGO) of US$ 2.2 million of Brazilian external
debt from a private bank for US$ 850,000 and its swap with the
government for internal debt (six annual payments of US$
132,000 in local currency, at 6% interest), to be used for the
management by a local NGO (the Fundação Pro-Natureza) of
the Parque Grande Sertão Veredas; or the swap, also by the
WWF, of US$ 2 million of Philippine debt for national bonds to
be used to set up two nature parks (Pearce and Warford, 1993).
how the main forest masses are distributed at
present: a situation which could well be described
as oligopolistic. The problem is that this oligop-
oly is not only not appropriate for solving the
global problem of poverty, as we already said, but
may even make it more difficult to solve the envi-
ronmental problems themselves. Thus, Stähler
(1996), using the optimum control theory, shows
that when the developed countries are willing to
pay more and more to maintain a resource as it
becomes increasingly scarce and the countries
that possess such a resource are few in number
and act strategically, the optimum form of behav-
iour of the latter may lead to a lower equilibrium
level of the total stock of the environmental good
in question than if no payment were made for its
preservation. In this respect, financing specific
conservation projects which involve some degree
of control over the resource may be a more suit-
able alternative than indiscriminate payment for
its conservation, although they may be less ac-
ceptable from the point of view of sovereignty.
VI
Access to common global
environmental resources:
a market for pollution rights
It might seem a contradiction in terms to emphasize
the need for more active defence of the environment
while at the same time bringing into the discussion
the idea of “pollution rights”. In reality, however, it
is probably not so.
Thus, as already noted in section II of this arti-
cle, the optimum degree of pollution is not zero,
since this would mean giving up the production and
consumption of almost all the goods and services on
which organized life is based. It would therefore
seem that human beings are willing to make use of
the biosphere to some extent to satisfy their own
needs.19 This naturally means making use of its posi-
tive functions while respecting its limits. Among the
most important of those functions is the capacity of
the biosphere to assimilate the wastes generated in
the processes of production and consumption; as the
principles of ecology rightly remind us, this is a
closed system in terms of matter, in which human
beings take a number of elements out of the bio-
sphere for their processing, use and enjoyment, on
the one hand, and return them in the form of wastes
and entropy on the other.
However, the capacity of the biosphere to absorb
these wastes is limited. So far, because the biosphere
is a freely accessible common resource, each person
has got rid of his wastes in the environment (the at-
mosphere, water or the soil) as he saw fit. The appli-
cation of this law of unrestricted appropriation has
brought the problems we are suffering now and calls
for a total reformulation of the situation: a reformula-
tion which would be reflected in the establishment of
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TABLE 1










Total, 8 countries 815 335 (56.75%)
World total 1 436 492 (100%)
Source: Stähler, 1996.
a The figure for India (36,450 thousand hectares) was omitted
because it was felt that it distorted the global conclusions of the
table.
19 For a discussion of the fascinating problem of whether this is
ethically defensible or not, see the articles included in Elliot
(1995).
limits on what can be returned to the environment in
the form of wastes and rubbish; for example, limits
on what can be emitted into the atmosphere without
endangering the viability of the system. In this re-
spect, since we are dealing with a scarce resource,
we may ask how the right to enjoy this environmen-
tal service –by emitting CO2 into the atmosphere, for
example– should be shared out. These are the “pollu-
tion rights” referred to earlier: the right to use the
services of the biosphere as a rubbish dump, within
the limits represented by the absorption capacity of
the system.20
The problem posed, then, is to find a means of
sharing out these emission permits which is both fair
and efficient.
One alternative which has been the subject of
many studies, both from the theoretical standpoint
and in terms of the simulation of its results, is that of
“buying” the participation of underdeveloped coun-
tries in schemes for the reduction of global pollution.
Examples of such studies include those by Bohm and
Larsen (1994) and Larsen and Shah (1994) on CO2
and the study by Klaasen, Forsund and Amann
(1994) on SO2. Let us take a look at one of them in
greater detail.
The above-mentioned study by Larsen and Shah
(1994), whose main results are summarized in table
2, is a good illustration in this respect. The authors
analyse the possibility of establishing a system of
marketable permits for the emission of carbon diox-
ide (CO2), with a view to stabilizing emissions in the
year 2000 at the 1987 levels.21 The problem is that if
an agreement of this nature is to have a chance of be-
ing effective, one cannot leave out the underdevel-
oped countries (the non-OECD countries, to simplify
the matter), which are responsible for 43% of all
emissions according to 1987 data. However, the in-
centives these countries may have for participating in
a scheme for the reduction of emissions are rather
limited. Taking into account the limits presented as
an objective and the marginal costs of reducing emis-
sions of CO2 (using the extended function proposed
by Nordhaus for this purpose),22 Larsen and Shah
come to the conclusion that the unit price of an
emission permit would be US$ 58 per ton. On the
basis of this, we can construct the cost/benefit func-
tion applicable to each country that participated in
the scheme, depending on how the permits are
awarded and assuming that, in equilibrium, each
country will reduce its emissions until the marginal
cost of doing so is equal to the price of the permit.
On this basis, various forms of distribution of
these “emission permits” are analysed, always bear-
ing in mind that a country will have an incentive to
participate in such agreements only if it receives an
amount of money, in respect of permits granted,
which exceeds the benefits it forgoes through its par-
ticipation. Let us look at four possible allocation
schemes:23
i) Allocation of rights as a function of popula-
tion, so that the per capita amount of permits is equal
in all countries (0.915 tons), as suggested some years
ago by the Indian economists Agarwal and Narain
(Martínez-Alier, 1992) and supported by such re-
spected figures as Herman Daly (Goodland and Daly,
1992). From a purely logical standpoint, it would
seem reasonable that every human being should have
the same right to use the atmosphere (while respect-
ing the limits mentioned earlier), so that every person
should have the same right to emit pollutants. This
assertion could be modified, if this is considered de-
sirable, to take account of the past and present re-
sponsibility of the various societies in creating the
problem (the stock of wastes already emitted) and
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20 The problem will not actually be posed in terms of individual
pollutants (such as CO2) but of desirable objectives and of the
contribution of groups of variables to their attainment
(Schaltegger and Thomas, 1996). For the analysis we are about
to make, however, this distinction is irrelevant.
21 At the summit meeting on climatic change held in the city of
Kyoto the objectives were somewhat different; the main thing,
however, is the theoretical framework provided by this study,
which would be easily adaptable to changes of this nature, with-
out affecting the basic results.
22 The cost function in question is as follows:
R = 1 – e-0.0054MC
where R is the percentage reduction of emissions of CO2 and
MC is the marginal cost of securing this reduction (in dollars
per ton).
23 The article in question also addresses two further questions.
The first concerns the problem raised by “free-riders”, and it
considers that if the allocation is taken into account as just one
more variable this will reduce the likelihood that this problem
will arise among the OECD member countries, although it ac-
knowledges that this possibility does not disappear altogether.
The second concerns the marginal cost function used (which
has been hotly debated), and the robustness of the results ob-
tained with various functions is analysed.
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TABLE 2
World: Costs (-) and benefits (+) of the different schemes for
the allocation of CO2 emission rights
(As a percentage of GDP)
Emissions Allocation options: net advantages as
Per capita per unit of Per capita percentage of GDP
Country GDP a GDP emissions
(kg/US$) a (kg) a
A B C D
Bangladesh 166 0.18 30 25.38 -0.16 0.23
Nigeria 229 0.37 84 26.63 -0.93 0.35
China 286 1.87 533 1.92 -6.06 1.15
India 322 0.57 182 7.92 -1.73 0.47
Pakistan 325 0.39 128 11.11 -0.68 0.31
Indonesia 443 0.35 153 6.41 -0.14 0.23
Zimbabwe 598 0.77 463 5.58 -2.04 0.52
Egypt 709 0.54 380 1.98 -1.75 0.48
North Korea 889 2.06 1 834 -3.58 -9.10 1.62
Mexico 1 715 0.55 943 -0.10 -1.46 0.43
Brazil 2 145 0.17 356 0.97 0.42 0.14
South Africa 2 493 0.92 2 292 -2.72 -3.63 0.77
Venezuela 2 629 0.49 1 276 -0.39 -1.30 0.41
South Korea 3 121 0.34 1 067 -0.64 -0.13 0.22
Poland 1 700 1.96 3 338 -5.83 -7.39 1.36
Yugoslavia 2 700 0.52 1 403 -0.42 -0.99 0.36
USSR 2 900 1.23 3 578 -3.79 -4.16 0.85
Czechoslovakia 2 400 1.71 4 110 -5.56 -6.28 1.18
Switzerland 26 115 0.06 1 580 -0.12 1.04 -0.15 -0.30
Iceland 21 873 0.09 1 955 -0.22 0.91 -0.22 -0.44
Norway 19 963 0.10 2 048 -0.26 0.85 -0.26 -0.51
Denmark 19 830 0.16 3 238 -0.54 0.58 -0.41 -0.81
Sweden 19 257 0.09 1 812 -0.21 0.89 -0.24 -0.47
Germany 16 754 0.20 3 427 -0.69 0.40 -0.51 -1.02
Finland 18 070 0.16 2 925 -0.51 0.59 -0.41 -0.80
Luxembourg 16 331 0.36 5 930 -1.38 -0.30 -0.91 -1.81
France 15 913 0.10 1 636 -0.22 0.85 -0.26 -0.51
Austria 15 441 0.11 1 717 -0.25 0.82 -0.28 -0.55
Netherlands 14 521 0.17 2 428 -0.57 0.57 -0.42 -0.83
Belgium 14 457 0.18 2 637 -0.55 0.50 -0.46 -0.91
Italy 13 176 0.13 1 691 -0.29 0.74 -0.32 -0.64
United Kingdom 12 024 0.23 2 707 -0.69 0.31 -0.56 -1.12
Ireland 8 353 0.25 2 170 -0.68 0.18 -0.64 -1.26
Spain 7 452 0.15 1 123 -0.18 0.64 -0.38 -0.75
Greece 4 619 0.31 1 437 -0.58 -0.07 -0.78 -1.55
Portugal 3 612 0.21 758 0.09 0.38 -0.53 -1.04
Turkey 1 293 0.50 649 1.36 -0.92 -1.26 -2.50
Japan 19 437 0.10 1 942 -0.25 0.87 -0.25 -0.50
United States 18 434 0.28 5 112 -1.01 0.08 -0.70 -1.38
Canada 16 056 0.26 4 221 -0.92 0.14 -0.66 -1.31
Australia 11 364 0.35 3 932 -1.16 -0.23 -0.87 -1.72
New Zealand 10 749 0.16 1 709 -0.33 0.60 -0.40 -0.79
OECD 0.20 3 015 -0.62 0.43 -0.50 -0.99
Rest of world 0.55 639 0.80 -1.47 0.43
World as a whole 0.34 1 112 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24
Source: Larsen and Shah, 1994.
a 1987 data.
solving it (by maintaining ecosystems that help to re-
duce wastes). In any case, however, the underlying
principle would remain the same: recognition that all
persons have the same right to enjoy the common
services of nature, without consideration of race,
wealth, or any other variable that might come to
mind.24 As already noted many times, the poor would
probably sell their rights cheaply, but whether they
sold them cheaply or dearly the calculations made re-
garding the benefits a scheme of this type would
bring the underdeveloped countries leave little room
for doubt: as may be seen from column A of table 2,
which shows the gains each country would derive
from participating in the agreement (measured by the
increase in GDP in the year 2000), the poor countries
would receive notable benefits. The bill would be
paid by the developed countries, which would only
be granted permits for 25% of their projected emis-
sions, and by most of the middle-income countries
and emerging economies.
ii) Allocation of rights as a function of the pro-
jected GDP of each country for the year 2000 with
respect to world GDP (0.23 kg per dollar). Under
this system, most of the low- and middle-income
countries and the emerging economies would lose
(column B), so they would not be willing to partici-
pate in a joint emission reduction effort which would
only favour the developed countries.
iii) Allocation of rights in such a way that they
would cover the projected emissions of the underde-
veloped countries for the year 2000. These countries
would therefore have no objections, in principle. The
rest of the emission rights, up to the proposed maxi-
mum permissible level, would be shared out among
the OECD countries as a function of, for example,
their past emission levels or any other criterion con-
sidered to be acceptable. The results for this system
(column C) indicate that many underdeveloped coun-
tries would gain by participating in an agreement of
this nature, for a very simple reason: the economic
value of the permits they could sell if they did not
use them would exceed the cost of adopting new and
less polluting technologies.
iv) Unilateral reduction of emissions by the
OECD countries. Under this system (column D) the
developed countries would assume that the other
countries were not going to take any measures at all
and would unilaterally reduce their emissions ac-
cordingly: exactly the same as in the previous case.
The difference would be that the emission permits
market would be limited to the participating devel-
oped countries, which would prevent them from tak-
ing advantage of the efficiency gains offered by the
fact that in the underdeveloped countries the cost of
reducing emissions or not using the permits allocated
to them would be lower. As a result, the price of the
permits (per ton of emissions) would rise from the
US$ 58 calculated by Larsen and Shah (1994) to
US$ 181.
On the whole, if emission permits were allo-
cated according to the first or third of the above op-
tions, this would be a much more promising scheme
than the previous ones with regard to the dual aspect
we have been analysing. With regard to the environ-
mental problem, this approach tries to achieve some
social objectives which would permit global
sustainability, and it is also a system which is com-
patible with incentives for the adoption of cleaner
technologies. As regards the problem of poverty, it
has the great advantage that, as it is a question of
global common resources, enjoyment of its benefits
does not depend on the arbitrary manner in which
nature distributed its “gifts”, and this would seem
more acceptable from the point of view of equity.25
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24 However, we should not forget the role of population policy:
a scheme like that proposed would favour the adoption of poli-
cies to promote high birth rates, discriminating against those
countries which are trying or have tried to contain their popula-
tion growth, and this might be ethically unacceptable.
25 As noted time and again, in order to avoid further aggravation
of the problems of poverty it is essential that the compensation
received in this respect should not end up in the hands of those
who do not need it. In this respect, it has been recommended
that this compensation should take the form of a reduction of
the external debt burden, which would make it possible to con-
siderably ease the adjustment programmes and the accompany-
ing budgetary cuts that would otherwise be necessary (Rotillon
and Tazdaït, 1996).
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Conclusions
In this study, we have analysed the possibilities
of relieving their poverty problems offered to un-
derdeveloped countries and regions by exploita-
tion of the comparative advantages deriving from
their endowment of environmental and natural re-
sources, within the framework of international
trade and without giving rise to further degrada-
tion of the environment but, on the contrary, en-
suring its sustainability.
Five possible schemes were studied in the light
of their potential contribution to solving both the
problems of poverty and those of deterioration of the
environment:
i) Ecological dumping, based on the supposedly
greater acceptance of pollution by the most under-
privileged segments of the world’s population. This
was rejected from both standpoints: both as poten-
tially harmful to the environment and as ethically un-
justifiable. Its apparent rationality was based on two
unacceptable premises: consideration of human life
as just another merchandise, and incomplete calcula-
tion of its true social costs.
ii) Production of goods which make intensive
use of renewable or non-renewable natural resources
with a market value. In this respect, emphasis was
placed on the limits established by the sustainability
of such operations, in the first case, and intergenerational
equity, in the second. Emphasis was also placed on
the fact that, with regard to the solution of environ-
mental problems, such efforts to derive income from
natural resources only permit the preservation of
those which offer financial yields higher than the
market interest rate, since the decision-making pro-
cess does not take account of the positive externali-
ties generated by the resource.
iii) Financial exploitation of certain services
provided by natural areas. These were viewed as
suitable areas for a certain type of environmentally
committed tourism, which would make it possible to
derive economic benefits from the so-called “cathe-
drals of nature”, provided they were suitably man-
aged, and as sources of raw materials for research,
especially in the pharmaceutical industry. The dual
problem presented by these two examples is that,
from the environmental point of view, they do not
solve the problem of all those environmental assets
which generate very considerable (and in some cases
vital) positive externalities but do not have an eco-
nomically appropriable value, while from the point
of view of the poverty problem they only offer solu-
tions to those countries which are fortunate enough
to possess such assets.
iv) Calculation of the economic value generated
by the environmental externalities of various assets
and ecosystems, for subsequent payment of the cor-
responding amount to their managers. This is a much
more powerful scheme for solving the environmental
problem, since it places a value on all assets and all
their environmental functions, regardless of whether,
through their exclusibility, a price can be charged for
their use. Unfortunately, this suffers from the same
limitation as the previous scheme with regard to the
problem of poverty.
v) Finally, the scheme which we consider to be
most promising for solving the two problems ad-
dressed is the trading on the market of the right to
use common environmental resources, especially the
capacity of the atmosphere (and the biosphere in
general) to absorb wastes. Supranational manage-
ment of the question of emissions into the atmo-
sphere, for example, would not only make it possible
to solve a very serious environmental problem but
would also, with the proposed scheme, provide the
most under-privileged countries and regions with
very substantial financial resources, independently of
their good or bad luck in terms of natural gifts.
The foregoing analysis economically values
the environmental functions of natural resources
and ecosystems, putting a price on them so that
they will be treated accordingly. This may be unac-
ceptable to those who reject the idea of treating the
environment as a form of merchandise because
they feel that in their relations with the biosphere
human beings should not reduce it to the level of a
good (Anderson, 1993, chap. 9). While we feel a
natural sympathy for this approach, however, it
should be remembered that what we are seeking is
that those who need to do so should earn revenue
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from the ecological functions of the various ecosys-
tems in order to safeguard them more efficiently,
with due compensation for those who have to forgo
their commercial exploitation. In this respect, the de-
cisions on their preservation are not left to the mar-
ket and their enjoyment is obviously shared: both
features that run counter to their supposed nature of
commercial goods. Naturally, the least promising
schemes in both fields are those which are already in
operation. The last two schemes analysed, which not
only require a supranational institutional framework
but also call for sacrifices by the more highly devel-
oped countries, would raise much more problems.
Even so, from the point of view of both efficiency
and equity they represent a much more promising
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